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Abstract
Cooperation structures without any a priori assumptions on the combi-
natorial structure of feasible coalitions are studied and a general theory for
marginal values, cores and convexity is established. The theory is based on
the notion of a Monge extension of a general characteristic function, which
is equivalent to the Lova´sz extension in the special situation of a classical
cooperative game. It is shown that convexity of a cooperation structure is
tantamount to the equality of the associated core and Weber set. Extending
Myerson’s graph model for game theoretic communication, general commu-
nication structures are introduced and it is shown that a notion of supermod-
ularity exists for this class that characterizes convexity and properly extends
Shapley’s convexity model for classical cooperative games.
Keywords: communication structure, convex game, cooperation structure,
Monge extension, Lova´sz extension, marginal value, ranking, Shapley value,
supermodularity, Weber set
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1 Introduction
The classical model of cooperative games assumes that every subset of a
set N of agents may form a coalition to execute the game. However, many
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situations require a more refined model in which only a restricted collec-
tion F of subsets describes feasible cooperation. In Myerson’s [25] com-
munication graph model, for example, only those sets of agents are feasi-
ble for communication that induce connected subgraphs. Other examples
arise from models where N is (partially) ordered by some dominance or
preference relation (e.g., Derks and Gilles [8], Faigle and Kern [14, 15],
Gilles et al. [17], Grabisch and Lange [18], Hsiao and Raghavan [19]). The
latter model was further relaxed and studied by Algaba et al. [3], Bilbao
et al. [2, 5] to combinatorial coalition structures of so-called antimatroids,
convex geometries and augmenting systems, and by Lange and Grabisch to
regular set systems [22]. All these generalized models for cooperation rely
on their particular combinatorial structure for the definition of Shapley-type
values, Weber sets and cores. Indeed, it appears difficult to reasonably de-
fine a notion of a ”marginal value” for cooperation models without special
structural properties. Moreover, it seems to be impossible to extend the con-
cept of supermodular characteristic functions, and hence of convex games,
to coalition systems that are not closed under union and intersection.
On the other hand, a natural notion for the core of a general cooperation
structure exists as a certain convex set in the Euclidean parameter space RN
(Faigle [12]), which suggests to study general cooperation from the point
of view of real convex analysis. For the classical model, such an approach
was indicated by Lova´sz [23] (see also Algaba et al. [4]). It is the purpose
of our present investigation to show that Lova´sz’ construction is actually a
special case of a quite general construction that is meaningful for arbitrary
cooperation structures.
The key in our analysis is the relaxation of the notion of a cooperative
game to cooperative game instances with given bounds on the activity levels
of individual agents. We obtain game instances by a straightforward rule that
goes back to Monge [24] and corresponds to the well-known north-west cor-
ner rule for the construction of feasible solutions for transportation problems
(Section 3). Our rule yields the Monge extension of the characteristic func-
tion v of the underlying cooperation structure to a function vˆ : RN → R.
Convexity properties of arbitrary cooperation structures can thus be studied
via their Monge extensions.
The Monge algorithm furthermore implies a natural ranking notion for
agents and thus a framework for marginal vectors, Weber sets and Shapley
values (Section 4). In a far-reaching extension of the classical results we
find that the Monge extension of a cooperation structure is concave (a.k.a.
convex down) if and only if its core and Weber set coincide (Theorem 5.2).
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In Section 6, we introduce communication structures as a particular class
of cooperation structures that are union-closed in a weak sense and hence in-
clude Myerson’s communication graph model as a special case. We show
that a meaningful notion of ”supermodularity” exists for this class and char-
acterizes convexity (Theorem 6.2). Hence convex communication structures
generalize in particular Shapley’s [28] convex cooperative games. Moreover,
we show that our general model of convexity implies the notion of convexity
introduced by Bilbao and Ordo´n˜ez [6] for games on so-called augmenting
systems, which form a subclass of communication structures.
We always assume that the characteristic function of a cooperation struc-
ture describes the gain a feasible coalition may achieve. As in the classical
case, our cores may equally well be interpreted as arising from associated
cost games. However, we will not explore the latter model in detail here.
2 Cooperation Structures
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. A cooperation structure on
N is a pair Γ = (F , v), where F is a family of non-empty subsets of N and
v : F → R+ is a non-negative valuation on F . We refer to a set F ∈ F
as a feasible coalition of Γ. In the case F = 2N \ {∅}, i.e., when each
non-empty subset of N constitutes a feasible coalition, we say that Γ is a
classical cooperative game.
REMARK. Strictly speaking, a classical cooperative game may include
coalitions F with negative value v(F ) < 0. Modifying v to a valuation v
with
v(F ) = v(F ) + κ · |F | (F ⊆ N),
where κ > 0 is a suitably large constant, however, any classical game is seen
to be essentially equivalent to a non-negative classical game.
The next example may serve as a motivation for leaving the classical
context. (It will be taken up in Section 6.)
Example 2.1 (Myerson Games [25]) Let G = (N,E) be a graph with
node set N and edge set E with the interpretation that x, y ∈ N may ”com-
municate” if {x, y} ∈ E. One is interested in the family F of those non-
empty subsets F ⊆ N that induce a connected subgraph of G and hence al-
low communication paths among all members of F to be established. v(F )
describes the value of the communication within the connected subgraph
with node set F .
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Throughout the paper we index the coalitions in F = {F1, . . . , Fm} so
that
(I1) Fi ⊇ Fj =⇒ i < j.
In some parts of the paper, we will suppose that v is monotone in the sense
F ⊆ F ′ =⇒ v(F ) ≤ v(F ′).
If monotonicity holds, we can (and will) assume in addition that the indexing
of coalitions also satisfies the property
(I2) v(F1) ≥ . . . ≥ v(Fm).
2.1 Game Instances with Activity Bounds
Let c ∈ RN be a fixed parameter vector. A c-feasible game instance is a
parameter vector y ∈ RF such that yF ≥ 0 holds for all F 6= N and
aj(y) =
∑
F∋j
yF ≤ cj for all j ∈ N.
We interpret yF as the activity level of the coalition F ∈ F (i.e., the
activity contribution of each j ∈ F relative to F ) in the cooperation effort.
So aj(y) measures the total activity of the player j with respect to y, and the
vector c plays the role of an activity bound. The value of the game instance
y is the parameter
y(v) =
∑
F∈F
yF v(F ).
Writing yF = y+F − y
−
F , where y
+
F = max{0, yF } and y
−
F = max{0,−yF },
we note
yF = y
+
F ≥ 0 for all F 6= N .
In the case N ∈ F , we may view σ(y) = y−N · v(N) as the setup cost
for the game instance y and the numbers y+F v(F ) as the values generated by
the coalitions F ∈ F at the activity levels y+F . The players j thus respect the
activity bounds
0 ≤
∑
F∋j
y+F ≤ cj + y
−
N .
In the following, we will allow for setup costs and therefore assume
• N ∈ F (and thus F1 = N in the listing F = {F1, . . . , Fm}),
unless stated otherwise.
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3 Monge Extensions
Assuming N ∈ F , we turn our attention to the construction of c-feasible
game instances y in the context (F , v) according to a generalized north-
west corner rule for transportation problems. We therefore refer to these
game instances as being Monge. For the description of the algorithm, we
use the notation
F(X) := {F ∈ F | F ⊆ X} for any X ⊆ N .
3.1 The Monge Algorithm
We construct sequences µ, pi and a vector y ∈ Rm as follows for any given
c ∈ RN . As usual, if µ, µ′ are sequences, µµ′ denotes the concatenation of
the two sequences, and  denotes the empty sequence.
Monge Algorithm (MA):
(0) Set X = N , µ = , pi =  and yi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Set γj = cj for all j = 1, . . . , n.
(1) Select the Fs ∈ F(X) with the smallest index s and the smallest
p ∈ Fs with γp = min{γt | t ∈ Fs}.
(2) Update µ← [µs], pi ← [pip], ys ← γp, X ← [X \ p];
Update γt ← [γt − γp] for all t ∈ Fs.
(3) If F(X) = ∅ then output (µ, pi, y) and stop;
Otherwise goto (1).
Let (µ, pi, y) be the output of the Monge algorithm and assume µ =
i1 . . . ik (with i1 = 1). Setting
M =M(µ) := {M1, . . . ,Mk} = {Fi1 , . . . , Fik} (i.e.,Ms = Fis),
we find
〈v, y〉 =
m∑
i=1
yiv(Fi) =
k∑
s=1
yisv(Ms).
Notice that the selection rule (1) and the update rule (2) in MA guarantee
yi ≥ 0 for all Fi 6= N . So y yields indeed a game instance. Moreover, we
have for all j ∈ N ,
∑
Fi∋j
yi
{
= cj if j occurs in pi
≤ cj otherwise.
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With the interpretation yFi = yi for i = 1, . . . ,m, the Monge algorithm
thus generates a c-feasible game instance. The output sequence pi of MA is
not necessarily a permutation of N , i.e., not every j ∈ N may occur in pi.
However, we observe that pi is representative for F in the following sense:
Lemma 3.1 Let (µ, pi = p1 . . . pk, y) be the output of the Monge algorithm
for some c ∈ Rn. Then F ∩ {p1, . . . , pk} 6= ∅ holds for all F ∈ F .
⋄
Example 3.1 LetN = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} andF = {12345, 2345, 1345, 124, 234,
345, 12, 35, 2, 5}, where ”12345” stands for {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} etc. (see Fig-
ure 1). For any c ∈ RN with c4 < c3 < c2 < c1 < c5, the algorithm will
∅
2
12
124
12345
5
35
345
1345
234
2345
Figure 1: Example of a family of feasible coalitions, ordered by inclusion.
produce the sequences µ = (1, 7, 8, 10) (corresponding to the coalitions
12345, 12, 35 and 5), pi = (4, 2, 3, 5) and the vector
y = (c4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, c2 − c4, c3 − c4, c5 − c3) ∈ R
F .
3.1.1 The Greedy Algorithm
If v is monotone and the coalitions are indexed according to the rules (I1)
and (I2), the Monge algorithm may be viewed as a greedy algorithm for the
construction of a game instance: Sequentially pick a feasible coalition Fs
of maximal value v(Fs) and assign to the variable ys the maximal possible
value y˜s without violating the individual activity bounds cj .
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Viewed as a greedy algorithm, the Monge algorithm is also meaningful
in the case N /∈ F . The output vector y˜ (the so-called ”greedy solution”)
will be feasible for the linear program
max 〈v, y〉 =
∑
F∈F
v(F )yF s.t.
∑
F∋p
yF ≤ cp, ∀p ∈ N.
Moreover, y˜ will be nonnegative for any (nonnegative) input c ≥ 0.
3.1.2 Rankings
The output pi = p1 . . . pk of the Monge algorithm provides a ranking of
the players of N : Sequentially pick a representative p of a feasible coali-
tion Fs of maximal possible value v(Fs) and discard the coalitions already
represented from further consideration.
3.2 The Extension Function
Notice that the output (µ, pi, y) of the Monge algorithm is uniquely deter-
mined by the input c ∈ Rn, provided the indexing of coalitions in F is
fixed. So MA yields a well-defined function
c ∈ Rn 7→ vˆ(c) := 〈v, y〉 ∈ R.
We call vˆ : Rn → R the Monge extension of the valuation v : F → R and
justify the terminology as follows.
Lemma 3.2 vˆ(1F ) = v(F ) holds for all F ∈ F , where 1F ∈ {0, 1}N is
the incidence vector of F ⊆ N (with components (1F )j = 1 if and only if
j ∈ F ).
Proof. Take F ∈ F and consider c = 1F . Since F ∈ F and all elements
corresponding to zeroes of c are selected first, Ms = F at some step s. So
vˆ(1F ) = v(Ms) = v(F )
follows by the definition of y.
⋄
REMARK. In the caseF = 2N \∅, the Monge extension vˆ corresponds to
the extension introduced by Lova´sz [23] for the set function v, which equals
the discrete Choquet integral [7] when v is monotone. The authors show in
a companion paper [13] how the Choquet integral extends to arbitrary set
families F via the Monge algorithm.
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4 Core and Weber Set
Let (F , v) be a cooperation structure with a monotone valuation v. We
define the core of Γ = (F , v) as the closed convex set
core(v) := {x ∈ RN | 〈c, x〉 ≥ vˆ(c), ∀c ∈ RN} ⊆ RN .
We next give a direct characterization of the core which exhibits core(v) as
a non-negative and bounded polyhedron. As usual, we employ the notation
x(S) := 〈1S , x〉 =
∑
j∈S xj for any x ∈ RN and S ⊆ N .
Theorem 4.1 Assume F ∋ N and v monotone. Then one has
core(v) = {x ∈ RN+ | x(N) = v(N), x(F ) ≥ v(F ), ∀F ∈ F}. (1)
Proof. Let P(v) = {x ∈ RN+ | x(N) = v(N), x(F ) ≥ v(F ), ∀F ∈ F}
and consider any x ∈ core(v). Since v is non-negative by monotonicity,
vˆ(c) ≥ 0 holds for every c ≥ 0. Letting c = 1j be the jth unit vector in RN ,
we obtain
xj = 〈1j, x〉 ≥ vˆ(1j) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N .
Moreover, vˆ(1N ) = v(N) and vˆ(−1N ) = −v(N) immediately yields
x(N) = 〈1N , x〉 = v(N). In view of vˆ(1F ) = v(F ) (Lemma 3.2), we
thus conclude x ∈ P(v).
To prove the converse, observe that any z ∈ P(v) is a feasible solution
for the linear program
min
x≥0
〈c, x〉 s.t. x(N) = v(N), x(F ) ≥ v(F ), ∀F ∈ F .
Let y be the output of the Monge algorithm with respect to c. Then y is a
feasible solution for the dual linear program
max
y
〈v, y〉 s.t.
∑
F∋j
yF ≤ cj , ∀j ∈ N, yF ≥ 0 ∀F ∈ F \ {N}.
So 〈c, z〉 ≥ 〈v, y〉 = vˆ(c) and hence z ∈ core(v) follows from linear pro-
gramming duality.
⋄
REMARK. Theorem 4.1 shows that core(v) coincides with the notion of
the positive core for ”cooperative games with restricted cooperation” intro-
duced in Faigle [12].
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4.1 Marginal Vectors
To study marginal vectors relative to the cooperation structure Γ = (F , v),
consider the output (µ = i1 . . . ik, pi = p1 . . . pk, y) of the Monge algorithm
with respect to the input c. Note that µ and y can be reconstructed from
the knowledge of the ranking sequence pi = p1 . . . pk (given the fixed linear
arrangement F = {F1, . . . , Fm}). We let Π denote the collection of all
possible ranking sequences.
Recalling the notation M(µ) = {M1, . . . ,Mk}, consider the (pi, µ)-
incidence matrix R = [rst] ∈ {0, 1}k×k with the coefficients
rst =
{
1 if ps ∈Mt
0 otherwise.
R is (lower) triangular with diagonal elements rss = 1 and hence invertible.
Let y (resp. v) and c denote the restriction of y (resp. v) to µ and of c to pi.
Then we have
Ry = c and vˆ(c) = 〈v, y〉.
Putting xT := vTR−1, we therefore obtain
vˆ(c) = vT y = xTRy = xT c = 〈c, x〉. (2)
We extend x to the vector xπ ∈ RN by setting xπp = xp if p occurs in pi
and xπ = 0 otherwise. xπ is the marginal vector of Γ = (F , v) associated
with c ∈ RN .
Lemma 4.1 The marginal vector xπ can be computed as follows:
(0) xπpk = v(Mk);
(1) xπps = v(Ms)−
∑
G≺Ms
v(G), for s = 1, . . . , k − 1
(where G ≺Ms means that G is a maximal member of the
family Ms(µ) = {G′ ∈M(µ) \ {Ms} | G′ ⊂Ms, }).
Moreover, xπ(Mt) = v(Mt) holds for t = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. (1) follows immediately from the relation
xπps = v(Ms)−
∑
{xpt | t > s, pt ∈Ms} (s = k − 1, k − 2, . . . , 1).
⋄
In the case N ∈ F , we have M1 = N and observe (from Lemma 4.1)
that xπ(N) = v(M1) = v(N) holds for any marginal vector xπ. Note
furthermore that Γ admits only a finite number of marginal vectors (since Π
is finite).
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Example 4.1 Let us take again the communication structure of Example 3.1.
Then the corresponding (pi, µ)-incidence matrix is
R =


1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1


and one obtains the solution x = [x4, x2, x3, x5] of the system
x4 + x2 + x3 + x5 = v(12345)
x2 = v(12)
x3 + x5 = v(35)
x5 = v(5)
as x = [v(12345) − v(12) − v(35), v(12), v(35) − v(5), v(5)].
4.2 Weber Set
We associate with the cooperation structure Γ = (F , v) the convex hull
W(v) of all marginal vectors xπ, i.e.,
W(v) := conv{xπ | pi ∈ Π}
and call the polytope W(v) ⊆ RN the Weber set of Γ.
Theorem 4.2 Assume N ∈ F . Then core(v) ⊆ W(v).
Proof. Suppose that the claim of the Theorem were false and a vector
z ∈ core(v) \ W(v) existed. Since W(v) is a closed convex set, we could
now separate z from W(v) by a hyperplane, i.e., there would be a parameter
vector c ∈ RN such that
〈c, z〉 < 〈c, x〉 for all marginal vectors x.
But then the marginal vector xπ ∈ W(v) associated with c would yield a
contradiction:
〈c, z) ≥ vˆ(c) = 〈c, xπ〉.
⋄
REMARK. For the classical case F = 2N \ ∅, Theorem 4.2 is due to
Weber [30].
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4.2.1 Shapley Value
It appears natural to define the ”Shapley value” Φ(v) of a cooperation struc-
ture as the average of its marginal vectors:
Φ(v) :=
1
|Π|
∑
π∈Π
xπ ∈ W(v), (3)
where Π is the collection of all possible rankings pi produced by the Monge
algorithm. In the classical case Γ = (2N \ ∅, v), Φ(v) coincides with the
value introduced by Shapley [27].
5 Convexity
We say that cooperation structure Γ = (F , v) is convex (or simply, that v
is convex) if its Monge extension vˆ : RN → R is a concave (a.k.a. convex
down) function, i.e., satisfies for all parameter vectors c, d ∈ RN and real
scalars 0 < t < 1,
tvˆ(c) + (1− t)vˆ(d) ≤ vˆ(tc+ (1− t)d).
Theorem 5.1 Assume N ∈ F and v is monotone. Then Γ = (F , v) is
convex if and only if for all c ∈ RN ,
vˆ(c) = min{〈c, x〉 | x ∈ core(v)}
= max{〈v, y〉 | yF ≥ 0, ∀F ∈ F \ {N},
∑
F∋j
yF ≤ cj , ∀j ∈ N}.
Proof. It is straightforward to check in the Monge algorithm that vˆ is
positively homogeneous in the sense
vˆ(λc) = λvˆ(c) for all c ∈ RN and real scalars λ ≥ 0.
A well-known result from convex analysis (see, e.g., Rockafellar [26]) there-
fore asserts that the concavity of vˆ is equivalent with vˆ being the lower sup-
port function of its core, which is the first equality claimed.
The second equality follows from linear programming duality with re-
spect to the core representation (1) of Theorem 4.1.
⋄
For the proof of an alternative characterization in Theorem 5.2, we need
a technical fact.
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Lemma 5.1 Let pi = p1 . . . pk ∈ Π be an arbitrary ranking sequence. Then
there exists some c˜ ∈ RN such that the Monge algorithm produces the output
(µ, pi, y˜) with the properties:
(i) y˜Ms > 0 for all s = 1, . . . , k.
(ii)
∑
F∋j
y˜F < c˜j for each j /∈ pi.
Proof. Let c ∈ RN be a parameter vector so that the Monge algorithm
produces the output (µ, pi, y). We now modify c to a weighting c˜ ∈ RN as
follows.
We choose some c0 > max{|cp| | p ∈ N} and replace each cp by
c′p = cp+ c0 ≥ 0. Relative to c′, the Monge algorithm then clearly produces
the output (µ, pi, y′) with y′ ≥ 0.
Each component c′ps with ps ∈ pi is now replaced by c˜ps = c′ps + 2s for
s = 1, . . . , k. Each of the remaining components c′j with j /∈ pi is replaced
by a large positive constant K ≫ 0 (e.g., K > 2c0 + 2n).
It is straightforward to verify that c˜ produces the same ranking sequence
pi as c′ and therefore as c. Moreover, the latter modification ensures property
(ii) to hold while the former modification guarantees (i).
⋄
Theorem 5.2 Assume N ∈ F and v monotone. Then Γ = (F , v) is convex
if and only if xπ ∈ core(v) holds for each marginal vector xπ, i.e., if and
only if
core(v) =W(v).
Proof. Assume first W(v) ⊆ core(v) and consider an arbitrary c ∈ RN
with associated marginal vector xπ ∈ W(v). Then we have
vˆ(c) ≥ min{〈c, x〉 | x ∈ core(v)}
= max{〈v, y〉 | yF ≥ 0, ∀F ∈ F \N,
∑
F∋j
yF ≤ cj , ∀j ∈ N}
≥ vˆ(c).
So equality holds throughout and exhibits Γ as convex by Theorem 5.1.
Conversely, consider the marginal vector xπ. By Lemma 5.1, xπ arises
from the MA-output (µ, pi = p1 . . . pk, y˜) relative to some input c such that
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(i) y˜Ms > 0 for all s = 1, . . . , k.
(ii) ∑F∋j y˜F < cj for each j /∈ pi.
If Γ is convex, y˜ is an optimal solution for the linear program
max{〈v, y〉 | yF ≥ 0, ∀F ∈ F \N,
∑
F∋j
yF ≤ cj , ∀j ∈ N}.
Let x˜ be an optimal solution for the dual linear program
min{〈c, x〉 | x ≥ 0, x(N) = v(N), x(F ) ≥ v(F ), ∀F ∈ F}.
Being optimal, x˜ and y˜ must satisfy the complementary slackness condi-
tions:
y˜Ms > 0 =⇒ x˜(Ms) = v(Ms) (Ms 6= N)
x˜j > 0 =⇒
∑
F∋j
y˜F = cj .
By (ii), the latter conditions imply x˜j = 0 if j /∈ pi. Because x˜(N) = v(N)
is true for the core vectors x˜, we conclude from (i) and the former conditions
that x˜ is identical to the marginal vector xπ, which means xπ ∈ core(v) in
particular. Since core(v) is a convex subset of RN , we therefore find in view
of Theorem 4.2:
W(c) = conv{xπ | pi ∈ Π} ⊆ core(v) ⊆ W(v).
⋄
REMARK. For the special case of classical cooperative games, Theo-
rem 5.1 was observed by Schmeidler [29], while Theorem 5.2 is due to
Lova´sz [23].
6 Communication Structures
We say that the cooperation structure Γ = (F , v) (with possibly N /∈ F) is
a communication structure if F is weakly union-closed, i.e., satisfies
(WU) F ∪ F ′ ∈ F for all F,F ′ ∈ F with F ∩ F ′ 6= ∅.
Note that the set systems F with property (WU) coincide with the union-
stable systems investigated by Algaba et al. [1].
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Example 6.1 Let G = (N,E) a graph with node set N and edge set E.
Consider any non-empty node sets F and F ′ that induce connected sub-
graphs of G. Then F ∪ F ′ induces a connected subgraph if F ∩ F ′ 6= ∅
holds. So the Myerson games on graphs (cf. Ex. 2.1) form a special class of
communication structures.
It follows from (WU) that the maximal feasible coalitions of a commu-
nication structure are pairwise disjoint. Hence a communication structure
naturally decomposes into pairwise disjoint communication structures, each
of them exhibiting a unique maximal feasible coalition. Without loss of
generality, we therefore assume N ∈ F in our subsequent analysis of com-
munication structures.
A special case of a communication structure is given when F is closed
under arbitrary unions. Examples arise from cooperative games under prece-
dence constraints (Faigle and Kern [14]), games with permission structure
(Gilles et al. [17]), or antimatroids, which are the complements of discrete
convex geometries (see, e.g., Korte et al. [21]). In view of F0 = 2N , every
classical cooperative game can be understood as a union closed communi-
cation structure.
REMARK. Algaba et al. [1] have proposed a ”Myerson value” for union-
stable structures as the (classical) Shapley value of an associated classical
cooperative game. This value, however, does not coincide with the Shapley
value (3) that arises naturally from the Monge algorithm for this class. The
notion of games on regular set systems introduced by Lange and Grabisch
(see [22], where a Shapley-like value is proposed) is also closely related to
Myerson games.
Example 6.2 A communication structure (F , v) is an augmenting system
in the sense of Bilbao [5] if it satisfies for all F,G ∈ F with F ⊆ G,
G \ F 6= ∅ =⇒ F ∪ {i} ∈ F for some i ∈ G \ F.
The class of union-closed augmenting systems is exactly the class of antima-
troids.
6.1 Greedy Communication Structures
We want to characterize convex communication structures (with N ∈ F).
To this end, we relax the definition and call an arbitrary communication
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structure Γ = (F = {F1, . . . , Fm}, v) greedy if the Monge algorithm
(viewed as a greedy algorithm) is guaranteed to produce an optimal solu-
tion for the linear program
max
y≥0
〈v, y〉 s.t.
∑
F∋p
yF ≤ cp, ∀p ∈ N (4)
for any (non-negative) c ≥ 0. Hence a convex communication structure
(F , v) is necessarily greedy (cf. Theorem 5.1).
We call the valuation v : F → R+ strongly monotone if it satisfies for
any F ∈ F and pairwise disjoint feasible sets G1, . . . , Gf ∈ F(F ) the
inequality
f∑
ℓ=1
v(Gℓ) ≤ v(F ).
Note that f = 1 exhibits every strongly monotone v to be also monotone in
the usual sense.
Example 6.3 Assume that F is closed under taking arbitrary unions. Then
v : F → R+ is strongly monotone if and only if v is monotone and superad-
ditive.
Lemma 6.1 If the communication structure (F , v) is greedy, then v is nec-
essarily strongly monotone.
Proof. Take F ∈ F and suppose that v(F ) < ∑fℓ=1 v(Gℓ) holds. Take
c = 1F and y the output of the Monge algorithm, whose only non-zero
component is yF = 1. Then y′ defined by
y′F := 0
y′G1 = · · · = y
′
Gf
:= yF = 1
y′G := yG = 0 otherwise
is feasible but 〈v, y′〉 > 〈v, y〉, a contradiction to the fact that y is optimal
for (4). ⋄
For the next definition, it is convenient to augment the family F to F0 =
{F1, . . . , Fm, Fm+1} with Fm+1 = ∅ and to set v(∅) = 0.
Let F,F ′ ∈ F be intersecting, i.e., F ∩ F ′ 6= ∅. Then F ∪ F ′ ∈ F
follows from the weak union property (WU), while F ∩ F ′ /∈ F may be
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possible. Nevertheless, (WU) implies that the maximal sets in the family
F0(F ∩ F
′) = F(F ∩ F ′) ∪ {∅} are pairwise disjoint. So we arrive at the
well-defined parameter
v(F ∩ F ′) :=
∑
{v(G) | G ∈ F0(F ∩ F
′) maximal}. (5)
Example 6.4 Assume that F is closed under arbitrary unions. Then for any
F,F ′ ∈ F , there is a unique maximal feasible set
F ∧ F ′ = ∪{G ∈ F0 | G ⊆ F ∩ F
′} ∈ F0
and v(F ∩ F ′) = v(F ∧ F ′) follows for any intersecting F,F ′ ∈ F .
We now say that the communication structure (F , v) is supermodular
(or simply, v is supermodular) if for any intersecting feasible sets F,F ′ ∈ F
the following inequality holds:
v(F ∪ F ′) + v(F ∩ F ′) ≥ v(F ) + v(F ′), (6)
where v(F ∩ F ′) is understood as in (5) if F ∩ F ′ /∈ F holds.
Lemma 6.2 If the communication structure (F , v) is greedy, then v is nec-
essarily supermodular.
Proof. Let F,F ′ ∈ F be intersecting. Then the supermodular inequality
is trivial if F ⊂ F ′ or F ′ ⊂ F holds. We thus assume that neither is the case
and consider the nonnegative parameter vector c = 1F∪F ′ + 1F∩F ′ . The
greedy solution y˜ for (4) yields
〈v, y˜〉 = v(F ∪ F ′) + v(F ∩ F ′).
On the other hand, the vector y ∈ RF with the components
yG =


1/2 if G ∈ {F ∪ F ′, F, F ′}
1/2 if G maximal in F(F ∩ F ′)
0 otherwise
is also a feasible solution with the objective value
〈v, y〉 =
1
2
[v(F ∪ F ′) + v(F ) + v(F ′) + v(F ∩ F ′)].
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So y˜ can only be optimal if the supermodular inequality holds.
⋄
We now investigate sufficient conditions and first recall that the support
of a vector y ∈ RF is defined as the set
supp(y) = {F ∈ F | yF 6= 0}.
Lemma 6.3 Assuming that (F = {F1, . . . , Fm}, v) is a supermodular com-
munication structure, let y∗ be the lexicographically maximal optimal solu-
tion for the linear program (4). Then supp(y∗) is a nested family, i.e., one
has for any Fi, Fj ∈ supp(y∗) with i < j,
either Fi ∩ Fj = ∅ or Fi ⊃ Fj .
Proof. Suppose Fi, Fj ∈ supp(y∗) are intersecting and Fs = Fi ∪ Fj . If
s < i were true, we could modify y∗ to the vector y with the components
yG =


y∗G + ε if G = Fs
y∗G + ε if G is maximal in F(Fi ∩ Fj)
y∗G − ε if G = Fi or G = Fj
y∗G otherwise
and obtain a feasible solution that is lexicographically strictly larger than y∗.
Moreover,
〈v, y〉 = 〈v, y∗〉+ ε
(
v(Fi ∪ Fj) + v(Fi ∩ Fj)− v(Fi)− v(Fj)
)
.
Supermodularity of v implies that also y must be optimal and we arrive at a
contradiction to the choice of y∗. So s = i and hence Fi ⊃ Fj must hold.
⋄
Theorem 6.1 The communication structure Γ = (F = {F1, . . . , Fm}, v) is
greedy if and only if the valuation v : F → R+ is strongly monotone and
supermodular.
Proof. The necessity of the conditions follows from Lemma 6.1 and
Lemma 6.2. We prove sufficiency by induction on the number |F| of feasi-
ble coalitions.
Let y be the greedy solution and denote by y∗ the (with respect to the
index order of F) lexicographically maximal optimal solution.
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CLAIM: yF1 = y∗F1 .
Now yF1 ≥ y∗F1 is a direct consequence of the Monge algorithm. So
it suffices to show that strict dominance yF1 > y∗F1 is impossible. Recall-
ing from Lemma 6.3 that supp(y∗) is a nested family, let {G1, G2, . . . , Gk}
be the collection of (inclusion-wise) maximal proper subsets of F1 in the
support supp(y∗). So the Gis are pairwise disjoint.
Let ε = min{yF1 − y∗F1, y
∗
G1
, . . . , y∗Gk} ≥ 0 and define y by
yF1 = y
∗
F1
+ ε
yGi = y
∗
Gi
− ε, i = 1, . . . , k
yG = y
∗
G otherwise.
Then y is a feasible solution and satisfies
〈v, y〉 = 〈v, y∗〉+ ε
(
v(N) −
ℓ∑
i=1
v(Gi)
)
≥ 〈v, y∗〉
by the strong monotonicity of v. Hence also y is optimal and lexicographi-
cally maximal, which implies y = y∗ and hence ε = 0, as claimed.
To finish the proof, consider the representative p1 ∈ F1 chosen by the
Monge algorithm. Because of y∗F1 = yF1 = cp1 = min{cp | p ∈ F1}, we
find:
y∗F = yF holds for all F ∈ F with p1 ∈ F . (7)
Let F ′ = {F ∈ F | p1 /∈ F}. Then F ′ is weakly union closed. More-
over, the Monge algorithm produces the value
∑
F∈F ′
yF v(F ) ≤
∑
F∈F ′
y∗F v(F )
on F ′. On the other hand, |F ′| ≤ |F| − 1 holds. So we know by induction
that the Monge algorithm is optimal on F ′. Taking (7) into account, we
therefore conclude
∑
F∈F
y∗F v(F ) ≤
∑
F∈F
yF v(F ) ≤
∑
F∈F
y∗F v(F )
and hence optimality of y.
⋄
REMARK. Theorem 6.1 generalizes Theorem 4 in [13].
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6.2 Convex Communication Structures
Theorem 6.1 allows us to characterize convex communication structures as
follows.
Theorem 6.2 Assume N ∈ F . Then the communication structure Γ =
(F , v) is convex if and only if v is strongly monotone and supermodular.
Proof. If Γ is convex, then Γ is greedy. Hence (by Theorem 6.1) the
conditions are necessary. Conversely, we show that a greedy communication
structure is convex if N ∈ F holds. It suffices to argue that the greedy
algorithm is optimal for the linear program
max 〈v, y〉 s.t. yF ≥ 0 ∀F 6= N,
∑
F∋p
yF ≤ cp, ∀p ∈ N. (8)
Indeed, let C ≫ 0 be a large constant and modify c to the vector c with
components cj = cj+C > 0. Then the greedy solution y˜ is optimal relative
to c. On the other hand we have
〈c, y〉 = 〈c, y〉 − Cv(N).
for each feasible solution y for (8). Since Cv(N) is constant, we conclude
that y˜ is also optimal for c.
⋄
Corollary 6.1 (cf. [6]) Let (F , v) be an augmenting system with a mono-
tone characteristic function v : F0 → R. Then (F , v) is convex if and only
if v is supermodular.
Proof. Any monotone function v on an augmenting system F is neces-
sarily strongly monotone.
⋄
REMARK. Convexity of augmenting systems is defined without refer-
ence to any Monge-type extensions and relative to a different model for We-
ber sets in [6]. Our Corollary 6.1 shows that the two notions of convexity
coincide on this special class.
Classical Cooperative Games. Assume F0 = 2N , i.e., (F , v) is a
classical cooperative game. Then F0 is the union- and intersection-stable
Boolean lattice of all subsets of N with the operations F ∧ F ′ = F ∩ F ′
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and F ∨F ′ = F ∪F ′. In this context, the supermodular inequality (6) is the
defining property for ”convex games” in the sense of Shapley [28].
The equivalence of v being supermodular and core(v) containing all
marginal vectors was first realized in the classical context by Edmonds [10]
(see also Faigle [11] and Ichiishi [20]). It is easy to see that a classical
non-negative supermodular function is necessarily monotone.
REMARK. We do not know of a characterization of general convex co-
operation structures (F , v) in terms of an appropriately generalized notion
of ”supermodularity”. (For some sufficient conditions, see, e.g., Faigle and
Peis [16].)
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